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Rethinking the Meaning of the Phrase "Surviving
Widow" in the Jones Act: Has the Time
Come for Admiralty Courts to
Fashion a Federal Law of
Domestic Relations?
ROBERT M. JARVIS*
INTRODUCTION
Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, popularly known
as the Jones Act,I provides that if a seaman2 is killed in the course
of his employment, his personal representative3 may bring an action
for damages for the benefit of a specified class of beneficiaries
headed by the decedent's surviving widow.
The foregoing proposition seems straightfoward, until one discov-
ers that the Jones Act does not define the phrase "surviving
widow." Nor is the term defined in the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act, which the Jones Act explicitly incorporates. 4 As a conse-
quence, federal courts sitting in admiralty are often called upon to
* Associate, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens in New York City; B.A., North-
western University, 1980; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1983; Member of the New
York and Arizona Bars. All of the views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of any other person or organization. This
Article is dedicated to the loving memory of my father, who lived to see the Article
started but did not live to see it finished. The invaluable assistance of Professor Linda J.
Silberman of the New York University Law School is gratefully recognized.
1. The Jones Act is now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
2. There has been considerable controversy concerning who qualifies as a seaman
under the Jones Act. For an article which reviews the subject see Hoffman, Recent
Decisions Determining Seaman Status Under the Jones Act, 6 MAR. LAW. 173 (1981).
Effective December 29, 1982, the Act was amended to preclude certain aliens from
coverage under the statute. The 1982 amendment does not bar all alien seamen from
recovery; only those aliens who work in the offshore oil and gas exploration and pro-
duction industry in areas outside and other than the United States outer continental
shelf are excluded. For an excellent article on foreign seamen and the Jones Act in
general, see Gliatta, Keeping Up With the Jones Act: The Effect of United States Based
Stock Ownership on the Applicability of the Jones Act to Foreign Seamen, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 141 (1982).
3. It should be noted that a Jones Act suit can only be maintained by the deceased
seaman's personal representative. An attempt by anyone, other than the personal repre-
sentative, to bring the suit will result in an invalid suit. See, e.g., Civil v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954).
4. The Federal Employers' Liability Act is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
For further information on the incorporation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
into the Jones Act, see M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES
§ 135 (3d ed. 1975).
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determine whether a particular claimant is a surviving widow enti-
tled to collect damages under the Jones Act.
Such cases present several difficult choice of law questions. Ini-
tially, there is the question whether the court should look to federal
or state law in defining the meaning of the phrase "surviving
widow." If the court chooses federal law, the inquiry then becomes
the relatively simple one of who is considered a surviving widow
under federal law.
Alternatively, if the court decides that state law controls the
question, the focus then turns to which state should have its law
applied. In our increasingly mobile society, it is not unusual to find
that several states can at least claim to have a connection to the
seaman and his wife. Such a connection can be based on the
couple's domicile or residence in that state, or the ownership of
property in the state. A host of other factors are also available to
support a state's contention of a significant relationship.5 Since the
consequence of choosing to apply the law of State A over that of
States B and C can dramatically affect the outcome of a particular
case,6 the question of which state had the greatest contact with the
couple is often of paramount importance.
Federal courts have typically decided these cases by choosing
state, rather than federal law to provide the meaning of the term
surviving widow. The rationale for the choice is the perceived need
to defer to the states on issues involving questions of family law, a
position which has been approved by the United States Supreme
Court.7
In choosing which state's law is to apply, the courts have fol-
lowed a "grouping of contacts" test.8 Under this approach, the
court locates the state which had the greatest number of contacts
with the seaman and his widow. Usually this method leads to
5. States will often claim a connection with a particular person for tax purposes.
When the potential tax liability is very large, fascinating struggles emerge between the
states. In the famous Dorrance litigation, which is reported at In re Dorrance's Estate,
309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1933); In re Dorrance's
Estate, 115 N.J.Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (Prerog.Ct.1934), aff'd, Dorrance v. Thayer-Mar-
tin, 13 N.J.Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (Sup.Ct.1935), affrd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184A. 743, cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936), the courts of both Pennsylvania and New Jersey found that
the decedent was domiciled in their state at the time of death. As a result, both states
taxed the estate, forcing the estate to pay $28 million in taxes. More recently, the How-
ard Hughes estate has raised similar questions, with the states of California, Texas and
Florida each claiming to be the proper beneficiary of the estate taxes. The United States
Supreme Court was forced to step into the controversy and agreed to exercise its origi-
nal jurisdiction. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164
(1982).
6. See infra notes 88-125 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
8. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS
§ 145(1) (1971).
[Vol. 21
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choosing the state in which the family home was maintained. On
some occasions, however, another state may be deemed to have had
a greater nexus with the couple, especially where there is no com-
mon household.
Once the state having the greatest link is identified, the issue to be
decided is whether the claimant is a surviving widow entitled to
collect damages for the decedent's death. Where the couple went
through a valid marriage ceremony, and no claim of divorce or de-
sertion is raised, the claimant will be deemed a surviving widow
entitled to enforce her claim under the Jones Act.
Problems begin to surface, however, if the couple did not go
through a valid ceremony. In some cases, it will be found that the
couple did go through a marriage ceremony, but the ceremony was
defective because of a prior marriage still in existence at the time of
the second marriage, or because some other statutory directive was
not met. In other cases, it will be discovered that the couple did not
go through a marriage ceremony at all.
When a valid marriage ceremony is absent, counsel for the widow
will attempt to prove the existence of a recognizable marital rela-
tionship by resorting to quasi-marital aids. It will be suggested that
the decedent and the claimant were involved in a common law mar-
riage, or that the claimant was the putative spouse9 of the decedent.
Resort to such quasi-marital relationships will often be rebuffed
by the federal courts. Adhering rigidly to state law, the federal
judge will refuse to find the quasi-marital relationships sufficient
unless they would confer legal widowhood under the prevailing
state law. In most cases, however, the state law will have been
amended to abolish recognition of such relationships. Where this is
the case, the widow has always been denied Jones Act compensa-
tion, even if it is proved that she lived with the decedent and was
dependent upon his earnings for some or all of her livelihood. The
decision of federal trial and appellate courts to unwaveringly follow
state law in determining whether a claimant who did not go
through a valid marriage ceremony may collect damages under the
Jones Act has resulted in four discernible problems in the adminis-
tration of American admiralty law.
First, it has made it difficult to state with assurance what the
likely outcome of any particular case will be. This is especially true
if the couple had contacts with two states, one that would recognize
the claimant as a surviving Jones Act widow, and one that would
not recognize her as a surviving Jones Act widow. Such could be
9. See infra note 105 for the meaning of the term "putative spouse." Although no
Jones Act case appears to have used it, there is also the term "de facto marriage."
These marriages are defective because of a failure to follow a statutory prescription.
1985]
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the case, for example, if the couple had a home in Washington,
D.C., which traditionally has recognized common law marriages,10
but the decedent worked as a seaman out of a port in Virginia,
which does not recognize common law marriages."1 Because of the
uncertainty of the result that a court would reach, and the under-
standable desire of the decedent's employer to avoid paying Jones
Act damages if the court applies the law of Virginia rather than the
law of the District of Columbia, much needless litigation occurs to
determine which law the court will choose.' 2
The second problem is forum shopping. This problem is a direct
outgrowth of the first. Because the outcome of a case can vary from
state to state, the personal representative often seeks to bring his
action in a state having a favorable marital statute. The defendant,
on the other hand, attempts to thwart such a suit by beating the
personal representative in the proverbial race to the courthouse. To
win the race the defendant brings his own action in a state which
favors him. For example, the defendant, usually a shipowner or a
subrogated insurer, will in many cases have a right to exoneration
by instituting a "limitation of liability" suit.13 By bringing this suit
10. The District of Columbia courts, while acknowledging that common law mar-
riages have been abolished in neighboring states, continue to recognize such marriages.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992 (D.C. 1977). Johnson was recently relied on
in Gordon v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 696 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1983) to reverse a
decision of the Retirement Board denying benefits to the insured's second wife.
11. Virginia has abolished legal recognition of common law marriages. Heflinger V.
Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316 (1923). Although Virginia will recognize a com-
mon law marriage if it is consummated in a place where such marriages are valid,
knowledge of an impediment will bar implementation of the common law marriage.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Holding, 293 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.Va. 1968).
12. If the court does bar recovery by the "widow," the Jones Act then directs that
recovery is to be had by the seaman's children. If there are no children recovery then
goes to the seaman's parents. If the seaman's parents have predeceased the seaman,
damages are to be paid to the seaman's dependent next of kin. Thus, it is in the defen-
dant's interest to have the damages descend to the lowest rung of the ladder. While the
seaman's wife, children and parents do not have to prove actual dependency on the
seaman's wages, the next of kin do have to prove such dependency in order to be able to
collect. In many cases, no such dependent kin will be found, or, if they are found, they
will have received only meager support from the seaman. Thus the size of their dam-
ages, relative to the damages which would have been collected by the seaman's wife,
children or parents, will be small.
13. For an example of a Jones Act suit considered within a limitation of liability
petition brought by the shipowner, see In re Industrial Transp. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1311
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also infra note 130 for further discussion.
Under the Limitation of Liability Act, now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1982), a
vessel owner may limit his liability to the value of the vessel after the occurrence of the
casualty giving rise to the limitation proceedings. The purpose of the Act is to protect
the shipowner from the financial ruin which would occur by having to pay off large
claims following a marine disaster. The concept of limitation developed in the Mediter-
ranean Codes in the 16th and 17th centuries and was transmitted into English law in the
18th century. The principle was at first rejected by American courts. The New Jersey
Steam Navigation Co. v. The Merchants' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 343 (1848). Shortly
thereafter, however, Congress passed the Limitation of Liability Act in 1851. The pur-
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and including a prayer to be excused from any Jones Act liability,
the defendant effectively frustrates the action of the personal repre-
sentative. Even when the defendant's plan is capsized by the court
severing the Jones Act cause of action, or refusing to grant the re-
quested limitation, it is usually late in the proceedings and the per-
sonal representative has expended a great deal of time and expense
in opposing the defendant's suit. The result is that the personal rep-
resentative will often settle on terms much more favorable to the
defendant than if the personal representative had won the race to
the courthouse.
A third problem, related to federal courts applying state statutes
dealing with domestic matters, is that the federal judge must delve
into areas of law with which he is likely to be completely unfamil-
iar. Although it is believed that our generalist judiciary is able to
master any area of law with which it may be confronted,14 the
amount of valuable and all too limited judicial resources which
must be expended in order to acquire the necessary mastery must be
questioned. Given that state courts have recently been working
overtime to invent new causes of action such as "palimony," 1 5 this
pose of the Act is to protect the commercial interests of the United States while induc-
ing investment in shipping. The Limitation Act has generated colorful case law. In
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1871), for example, the United States Supreme
Court found the statute so poorly drafted that the next year they took the extraordinary
step of issuing its own rules on limitation. Even this, however, did not help. Subse-
quent appeals in the Norwich case were still being presented to the Court as late as 1886.
The City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886). Limitation
proceedings have invariably followed all modem sea disasters. The doomed S.S. Ti-
tanic, for example, spawned limitation litigation which reached the Supreme Court in
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718 (1913). The case presented in-
teresting choice of law questions, and the Court held that all vessel owners, whether
foreign or domestic, who filed a limitation proceeding in a United States court, had the
right to have their claims decided pursuant to American law. When the M/V Torrey
Canyon sank in March, 1967, fouling the beaches of England and France with thirty-
five million gallons of oil, a limitation suit was brought in the United States. Since one
lifeboat, having a salved value of $50 had been saved from the vessel, the federal court
permitted the ship owner to establish a $50 limitation fund. For a further discussion of
the Torrey Canyon case, see Jarvis, Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Company: A New
Opportunity for Industry to End State Regulation of Coastal Oil Pollution?, 19 GONz. L.
REV. 265, 278 n.88 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Jarvis].
14. As a result of the prevailing belief in a generalist judiciary, Congress has re-
sisted attempts to create specialized courts. For an interesting discussion, see Jordan,
Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 745 (1981).
15. In Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976),
the California Supreme Court held that an unmarried person could recover from a per-
son with whom she had cohabitated in accordance with any written contract between
them unless the agreement rested on an unlawful meretricious consideration. The court
further held that even where there was no such written contract, a party could still
recover if the court could find an implied contract. Even if no contract, whether ex-
press or implied, could be found, the court held that the doctrine of quantum meruit
could be used, along with other equitable remedies, in order to recognize the interests of
the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff in Marvin, Michelle Triola, eventually was denied
recovery on all three grounds, the case has spawned a vast amount of litigation. These
1985]
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waste of judicial resources is likely to grow ever larger.
The final problem caused by the present deference to state law is
that it too often results in the denial of benefits to a class which
ought to be compensated. By denying benefits to those claimants
who cannot present the requisite documentation, the federal courts
particularly fail in their historical role as guardian to the seaman.
Although it has long been said that seamen are the wards of the
admiralty courts, 16 it is difficult to believe that the courts are being
effective and proper guardians when they fail to take care of the
ward's loved ones.
In light of the foregoing, this Article has two purposes. First, it
will detail the reasons why the courts have interpreted the Jones
Act in the way they have. Second, it will suggest a potential solu-
tion to the problems caused by this interpretation.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE JONES ACT
A. Passage of the Jones Act
In 1915 Congress passed an omnibus statute known as the Sea-
Marvin-inspired cases have received varying responses from the courts around the coun-
try. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, refused to follow the Marvin precedent.
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). The New York Court of
Appeals, however, followed the Marvin case to the extent that express contracts be-
tween former lovers would be recognized, even if the contract was oral. Morone v.
Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980).
16. Seamen have long been thought to require special protection from the admi-
ralty. Whether such perceived need stemmed from the lack of education of most marin-
ers, or the rigors of shipboard life, or the need to have an able-bodied merchant marine
to carry on trade and commerce, is an open question. The likely answer is that all three
factors probably played a part in the development of a wardlike relationship between
courts and seamen. For a general statement of the relationship, see Harris v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). For an application of the principle in a
Jones Act setting, see also Jacob v. City of New York, 119 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1941),
rev'd, 315 U.S. 752 (1942), in which both Judge Learned Hand and his cousin, Judge
Augustus Hand, participated. Of course, courts have sometimes leaned too far in the
direction of the seaman. In Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951), a majority of
the United States Supreme Court held that a sailor was entitled to recover support from
his employer for injuries sustained when he became drunk while on shore leave and fell
off a balcony. The Court explained that "if leeway is to be given in either direction, all
the considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the
sailor's behalf." Id. at 530. State courts have been similiarly sympathetic. See Kois-
tinen v. American Export Lines, Inc., 194 Misc. 942, 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1948), which applied the guardian-ward relationship to a seaman who injured himself
while making a hasty retreat from a brothel. In England, seamen also received special
treatment. Thus it was said in D. MACLACHLAN, THE LAW OF MERCHANT SHIPPING
156 (7th ed. 1932):
We come now to consider the contracts, rights and duties of seamen. This
meritorious class of His Majesty's subjects, so essential to the power and pros-
perity of this country, long have been favoured objects with the British Parlia-
ment; and still in every later enactment alike their merits and their need
continue to be acknowledged, by the accumulation of guards and protection in
addition to those with which they were already surrounded.
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 3, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss3/2
1985] "SURVIVING WIDOW"
man's Welfare Act. 17 The Act regulated a number of subjects of
importance to the working conditions of seamen, including wages,
treatment aboard ship, desertion and the availability of life-saving
equipment. The twentieth and last section of the Act provided that
a seaman could sue his employer for injuries he sustained due to the
negligence of any member of the crew, including the master, in the
management or navigation of the vessel."'
Congress' purpose in enacting section 20 was to overturn the
third proposition of a case known as The Osceola.19 In that case the
United States Supreme Court held, inter alia,20 that a seaman could
not sue to recover for the negligence of another member of the crew
because all members of the crew were fellow-servants. 21 Conse-
17. Known as the LaFollette Act after its chief backer, the bill was passed as Pub.
L. No. 63-302, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
18. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows: "That in any suit to recover damages
for any injury sustained on board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall
not be held to be fellow-servants with those under their authority." Pub. L. No. 63-302
§ 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915).
19. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
20. In The Osceola, a crew member had libeled the ship in rem to recover for inju-
ries received in carrying out an order of the master. As presented, the case was one of
the few to have ever raised a question of pure operational negligence. Since counsel for
the crewman conceded that the ship was seaworthy in all respects, the seaman's injury
was caused solely by his proper execution of an improvidently given order. The district
court found for the seaman, and the circuit court certified the case to the Supreme
Court. Justice Brown, writing for the Court, came to four conclusions regarding the
rights of a seaman injured while working aboard a vessel: 1) an injured seaman was
entitled to maintenance and cure for at least as long as the voyage continued; 2) the
owners and the vessel were liable for all injuries due to unseaworthiness; 3) all members
of the crew, with the possible exception of the captain, were fellow-servants; 4) a seaman
could not recover for the negligence of the master or the crew. Id. at 176. The first of
these propositions might need explanation for shore based lawyers. Maintenance and
cure is a traditional remedy which is provided to fallen seamen by their ships. Under it,
the seaman receives wages to the end of the voyage and care until the maximum cure
obtainable for the injury has been reached. Maintenance and cure can be withheld,
however, if the seaman's injury was due to the seaman's gross negligence or was caused
by a pre-existing condition which the seaman intentionally concealed at the time that he
signed onto the voyage. Otherwise, the shipowner is under an absolute duty to provide
maintenance and cure.
Although cure can run into thousands of dollars for a prolonged illness requiring
hospitalization, the shipowner rarely pays for such costs because most seamen check
into Sailor's Hospitals or Homes run by the United States. The service is reviewed at G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LA\v OF ADMIRALTY § 6-11, at 301-02 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. As for maintenance, the traditional rule was
that a seaman was entitled to no more than $8 a day. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S.
527 (1962). Recently, however some courts have begun to approve maintenance pay-
ments at the rate of $20 a day. Autin v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 641 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1981).
Other courts, however, continue to award $8 a day. Gajewski v. United States, 540 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). As to why the figure of $8 became the standard measure of
maintenance, see Incandela v. American Dredging Co., 659 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
21. The fellow-servant doctrine's rise and subsequent fall has been thoroughly re-
counted in W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAv OF TORTS § 80 (5th ed. 1984). The
rule first appeared in England in Priestley v. Fowler, 31, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837) and
was adopted in this country in Murray v. South Carolina R.R. Co., 26 S.C.L. 166 (1
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quently, the negligence of any one of them was imputed to all of
them, and the action was barred.
Section 20 was put to judicial scrutiny shortly after its enactment
in Chelentis v. Luckenbach SS. Co. 22 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts and held that despite
the passage of section 20, a seaman could still not sue for injuries
suffered due to the negligence of a crew member. The Court ex-
plained that the fellow-servant rule was not a bar to such an action.
The bar to recovery was the recognition that the only right under
maritime law for a seaman's injury sustained through negligence
was the traditional one of "maintenance and cure."' 23 Thus, it was
irrelevant that Congress had abolished the fellow-servant rule, be-
cause that rule had never stood in the way of a recovery for
negligence.
It has, of course, been pointed out that the Court could easily
have interpreted section 20 to mean what Congress evidently had
intended: that seaman were now free to sue for negligence regard-
less of the previous imputed negligence bar.24 Yet such was not the
MeMul.) (1838) in the following year. Under the rule an employer was held blameless
for the injuries caused to an employee solely by the negligence of a fellow worker. The
rationale used to support the rule was that the injured worker, upon beginning his em-
ployment, assumed the risk of negligence on the part of his co-workers. In this way, it
was thought that workers would be watchful of one another, thereby promoting the
general safety of the business. As Professors Prosser and Keeton point out, however,
the rule probably had less to do with promoting work safety as it did with the general
desire of 19th century courts to promote industry by making the burdens of running an
enterprise as light as possible for the employer. The fellow-servant rule was eclipsed
with the adoption of state workmen's compensation acts, the last of which was enacted
in Hawaii in 1963.
22. 243 F. 536 (2d Cir. 1917), aff'd, 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
23. See supra note 20 for the meaning of maintenance and cure. The reader would
be left with an incomplete picture without a few words about the context in which the
Chelentis case arose. In the early part of the 20th century the United States Supreme
Court was busily developing an expansive interpretation of the federal admiralty juris-
diction, which substantially cut back on what maritime matters could permissibly be
controlled by state regulation. Just why the Court should have been concerned with
this question in the early days of the 1900's is discussed in detail in Jarvis, supra note 13,
at 281 n.108. The opening salvo of the Court's attack on state maritime regulation
came in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), in which a bitterly divided
Court ruled that a New York workmen's compensation statute impermissibly conflicted
with a parallel federal statute. When in the next year Chelentis reached the Supreme
Court, it provided a perfect vehicle for the Court to continue striking down state regula-
tion. The Chelentis case was brought in a state court, and the opinion of the Supreme
Court was penned by Justice McReynolds, who had written the Jensen decision. Jensen
became firmly moored two years later when the Court relied on it in Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). In that case the Court rebuffed a congressional
attempt to allow claimants to bring admiralty claims by relying on the workmen's com-
pensation laws of their home states. This subsequently led to the passage of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in 1927. As amended, the Act is
now found at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1982). Thus, it can be seen that the Chelentis out-
come was in many ways predestined.
24. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-20, at 326. Professors Gilmore and
8
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case,25 and Congress was forced to go back to work on the problem.
Two years after the Chelentis decision Congress was back with its
answer. This answer emerged in section 33 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920.26 Like the 1915 Seaman's Welfare Act, the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 was an omnibus bill. Among other things, it
established the United States Shipping Board, placed into operation
a comprehensive Ship Mortgage Act, and made important amend-
ments to the Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910.27
Section 33 of the 1920 Act, like section 20 of the 1915 Act, had
nothing to do with the statute in which it was contained. Although
the purpose of section 33 was to amend section 20, it caused little
debate or discussion as it made its way through the various commit-
tees and onto the floors of the House and Senate of the Congress.
Indeed, a review of the legislative history of the Merchant Marine
Black believe that the Court was simply attempting to "goad Congress" into writing a
clear piece of legislation. Some lower courts, of course, clearly understood Congress'
intention despite the inartful drafting. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for exam-
ple, explained that Section 20 of the Act "was intended to enlarge the existing rights of
seamen by providing that, in suits to recover damages for injuries, 'seamen' having com-
mand should not be held to be 'fellow-servants with those under their authority.'" Ger-
radin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927, 928-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642
(1932). The most likely reason the Court chose to not find the congressional purpose
was, therefore, probably not due to a desire for clear drafting. Rather, as explained in
supra note 23, the Court did not devine Congress' purpose, because to have done so
would have side tracked its efforts to expand the federal admiralty courts' jurisdiction at
the expense of state courts.
25. See supra note 20 for the other holdings of the Court. What should be
remembered about the Court's decision, but often isn't, was that it meant to address the
three questions which had been certified to it by the circuit court. Those questions
were:
1) was the ship liable to a crew member due to an improvident order of the
Master? [The Court said no];
2) are masters and their crews fellow-servants? [Yes];
3) was the vessel or its owners liable to the seaman on the facts presented?
[No].
Much of the confusion attributed to the Court's opinion is understandable once it is
remembered that the Court was seeking to answer the questions posed to it.
26. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
27. The Act established the Shipping Board because there was a surplus of Ameri-
can tonnage following the end of World War I. The purpose of the Board was to pro-
vide policy decision making and implementation in regards to the American merchant
marine.
The Ship Mortgage Act, now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1982), was designed to
encourage private investment in shipping by providing credit through the government
of the United States. As Professors Gilmore & Black point out, however, the Act basi-
cally failed to increase private investment in shipping following the end of World War I.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 9-48, at 691.
The Federal Maritime Lien Act is now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1982). It
provided a uniform law on the subject after a bewilderingly number of complex state
lien acts had succeeded in scuttling, figuratively, if not literally, untold number of ships
with concepts such as the "home port" doctrine. For an excellent article written shortly
before the passage of the Federal Act, see Smith, The Confusion in the Law Relating to
Materialmen's Liens on Vessels, 21 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1908).
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Act contains surprisingly little on section 33.28 It is regrettable that
the section received so little comment. As will be discussed, 29 sec-
tion 33 has the unmistakable look of having been put together late
one night by an uncaring draftsman. The problems now under dis-
cussion are a direct product of this poor drafting.
B. The Language of the Jones Act
Section 33 of the Jones Act states that:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all stat-
utes of the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway em-
ployees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a
result of any such personal injury the personal representative of
such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United
States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the
case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located.30
From the foregoing passage it can be seen that the Jones Act is an
odd piece of drafting. Since its enactment it has spawned a great
deal of confusion. Professors Gilmore and Black, for example, have
reminded their readers that at one time the editors of the "United
States Code Annotated prefaced the statute with a seventy-page es-
say entitled Commentary on Maritime Workers, supplemented by a
diagrammatic 'Chart to Illustrate the Jurisdiction of the
Courts.' "31 This was deleted in 1958 when it was realized that
mastering the quagmire of case law spawned by the inartful drafting
of the Jones Act was impossible. 32
For present purposes, however, the difficulty of the Jones Act is
readily mastered. The Act does not say who is entitled to collect
damages if a seaman, injured through the course of his employment,
dies as a result of such injury. Indeed, the statute does not even say
what causes of personal injury may give rise to compensation. All
this, and more, is left to be worked out by resorting to the laws
relating to the injury and death of railway workers.
28. The legislative history of the Act is found at S. Rep. No. 573, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1920), and at H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
29. See infra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text.
30. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
31. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-20, at 327.
32. Id.
[Vol. 21
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II. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
A. Language of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
The references in the Jones Act to the laws regulating the injury
and death of railway workers refer to sections 51-60 of Title 45 of
the United States Code, which is commonly known as the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA).33 Under FELA any employee of
an interstate rail carrier may recover damages from the carrier for
injury or death which results in whole or in part from the negli-
gence of the carrier's officers, employees or agents, or from the in-
sufficiency or defectiveness of the carrier's cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equip-
ment, if such defectiveness or insufficiency was the result of
negligence.3 4
Although the contributory negligence of the employee cannot bar
recovery, it can be used to reduce the size of the employee's
award.35 FELA contains a broad section which effectively abol-
islies the defense of "assumption of risk" in all but the most extreme
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) reads as follows:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territo-
ries, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories,
or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any
foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of
the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the bene-
fit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if
none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin
dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such
carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its
cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves,
or other equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth
shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by
such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the bene-
fits of this chapter.
35. Section 3 of FELA, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 provides:
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common
carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter
to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such inju-
ries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to such employee; Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or
killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case
where the violation by such carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of
employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.
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cases, 36 and any attempt by the carrier to exempt itself from FELA
liability, whether by "contract, rule, regulation or device" is
deemed void. 37 Actions are to be commenced within three years
from the date the cause of action first arises, and federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction.38 An important proviso states
that any action which is begun in state court cannot be removed to
federal court.39
B. Problems Caused by the Incorporation of FELA into the Jones
Act
The Jones Act states that all provisions of all laws relating to the
personal injuries and deaths of railway workers are to be applied to
seamens' actions arising under the Jones Act. At one time it was
thought that this proscription was to be taken literally, but in an
early case the United States Supreme Court made it clear that the
application of FELA to Jones Act cases should be done without
undue literalness.40
Professors Gilmore and Black have described the resulting rela-
36. As amended in 1939, section 4 of FELA is codified at 45 U.S.C. § 54 and states
that:
In any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or the death
of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the
risks of his employment in any case where such injury or death resulted in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employ-
ees of such carrier; and no employee shall be held to have assumed the risks of
his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of
any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or
death of such employee.
37. The rule is section 5 of FELA, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1982), which reads:
Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of
which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liabil-
ity created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any
action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein any
sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity
that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto
on account of the injury of death for which said action was brought.
38. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982).
39. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-26, at 352 n.158 and § 6-28, at 357-
58; the no removal provision was originally included in section 56. In 1948, the provi-
sion was dropped from section 56 but a companion provision was retained in the Judi-
cial Code, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1982). See also Pate v. Standard Dredging
Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952) cited by the authors.
40. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955). The Cox decision was decided in the same
year the Court decided Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310(1955). Although Wilburn is discussed, see infra note 100 and accompanying text, Cox
can be put into perspective by saying a few words here about Wilburn. In Wilburn the
Court decided that admiralty law should be flexible. At times it should create its own
rules, while at other times it should look to the law prevailing on land. As it was
worked out by the lower courts this desire, to keep flexibility in the admiralty law, can
be seen as the rationale for the Cox opinion.
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tionship between FELA and the Jones Act in light of this "rule of
reason" by saying that:
This proposition unavoidably shrouds the relationship between
the two statutes in a sort of floating ambiguity, which becomes
peculiarly intense whenever FELA is amended. There is no rea-
son to believe that amendments to FELA do not carry over to
the Jones Act (although the Supreme Court has never so held),
but, even if there is carry-over, it must be decided anew in each
case whether the particular amendment can "reasonably" apply
to the Jones Act.41
Besides this statutory confusion and the obvious fact that FELA
was drafted to address the unique problems of the railroad industry,
for present purposes the main problem is the designation of benefi-
ciaries under FELA. Under section 51 of FELA, the personal rep-
resentative of the deceased railroad worker brings a suit, in the first
instance, for the benefit of the surviving widow. FELA does not,
however, state who is to be a surviving widow under the Act.42
C. Interpreting the Meaning of the Phrase "Surviving Widow" in
FELA
Shortly after FELA was enacted in 1908, the United States
Supreme Court was called on to decide who were the surviving next
of kin entitled to sue under the Act. In Seaboard Air Line Railway
v. Kenney,43 the defendant urged the Court to disregard the law of
North Carolina, the controlling state law, if state law was applica-
ble, and to apply federal common law to interpret the meaning of
the words "next of kin" as used in the Act.44 The Court rejected
41. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-26, at 352 (footnote omitted). For
a case where the Jones Act was saved from constitutional infirmity by the "rule of
reason," see also Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
42. 45 U.S.C. § 51. See supra note 34.
43. 240 U.S. 489 (1916).
44. Id. at 492. The facts of the case are somewhat difficult to follow. The personal
representative brought a suit under FELA for the benefit of three claimants: Sills, Joe
and Nettie Hardy. The decedent was the illegitimate child of the mother of Sills, Joe
and Nettie. The mother of the decedent had pre-deceased the decedent. Since the dece-
dent was unmarried at the time of his death, the FELA beneficiary ladder went as
follows: first, to the decedent's wife (there was none); then to the decedent's children
(there were none); then to the decedent's parent's (his mother was dead and his father
was presumably unknown since the decedent was an illegitimate child); then to the
decedent's next of kin, if they were actually dependent. Thus, the personal representa-
tive had to prove that Sills, Joe and Nettie were the next of kin of the decedent and they
had been actually dependent on the decedent prior to the decedent's death. At one
time, of course, half-siblings were not considered next of kin, because of the stigma
which society attached to illegitimate children. Indeed, at early common law illegiti-
mate children had few, if any rights. Today, however, these distinctions based on birth
have been found to be constitutionally infirm. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In Seaboard, the Court agreed with the lower
court and disposed of the half-sibling issue by finding that "[I]t is very clear that in
1985]
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defendant's position, and decided that state law should be used to
answer the question of who was a next of kin capable of taking
under the Act. The Court explained that:
[P]lainly the statute contains no definition of who are to consti-
tute the next of kin to whom a right of recovery is granted. But
as, speaking generally, under our dual system of government who
are next of kin is determined by the legislation of the various
States to whose authority that subject is normally committed, it
would seem to be clear that the absence of a definition in the act
of Congress plainly indicates the purpose of Congress to leave the
determination of that question to the state law. . . .The argu-
ment that such result [applying federal common law] must have
been intended since it is to be assumed that Congress contem-
plated uniformity, that is, that the next of kin entitled to take
under the statute should be uniformly applied in all the States,
after all comes to saying that it must be assumed that Congress
intended to create a uniformity on one subject by producing dis-
cord and want of uniformity as to many others.45
In deciding to look to state, rather than federal law in order to de-
termine who was a next of kin under FELA, the Supreme Court
followed a long tradition of federal courts choosing to defer to state
legislatures and state courts on issues involving domestic relations.
If counsel for the defendant was familiar with this long line of
cases he would have had no reason to be surprised by the Court's
decision. Because of this long tradition, the outcome of Jones Act
cases involving claimants who did not go through valid ceremonial
marriages, as detailed by state statute, has often been a foregone
conclusion. It may therefore be useful to reflect somewhat further
on the divison between federal and state courts on matters of admi-
ralty and domestic relations. It is also useful to compare the Amer-
ican practice with that of England, since, as the Seaboard Line case
acknowledges, our jurisprudential system is inextricably interwoven
with that of England.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. American Practice Relating to Deciding Cases Involving
Admiralty and Family Law
Since the earliest of times admiralty and family law matters have
been separated into two distinct legal worlds in America. As a rule,
admiralty cases are heard by federal courts, while family cases are
heard by state courts. Initially, this dichotomy did not exist. When
North America was under the control of the British, for example,
North Carolina the two half brothers and the sister of the intestate are his next of kin."
Id.
45. 240 U.S. at 493-94.
[Vol. 21
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the common law courts handled admiralty matters along with a
wide variety of other causes.46 When, towards the end of the seven-
teenth century the British became concerned with the administra-
tion of the American colonies (mostly over the issue of enforcing
the acts of trade), they set up a system of specialized vice-admiralty
courts tribunals.47 The purpose of these new courts was to establish
tighter control of colonial government and effectively regulate colo-
nial commerce. 48 Although these tribunals never achieved the sort
of control sought by the British,49 they do appear to have carried on
a fair amount of maritime work. At the same time, however, many
admiralty matters were brought before courts in which locally ap-
pointed judges were sitting.50
This confused state of affairs lasted for approximately seventy-
five years, until the revolution broke out. At that time each state
took complete charge of all of the admiralty matters occurring in
the territory under the jurisdiction of the revolutionary state gov-
ernment. 51 In most instances the states turned to their own courts
to handle the cases. One admiralty matter recieved special legisla-
tion. At the urging of the national government, many states passed
laws regulating the subject of prizes.52 The Continental Congress
envisioned that a right of appeal would exist from the state courts
dealing with prizes and captures of enemy vessels to the Congress.
46. D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM chs. I - IV (1970) [hereinafter
cited as ROBERTSON]. Professor Robertson's book is the leading work currently in
print on the subject of the early development of American admiralty courts.
47. Id. at 69-70.
48. Id. at 71.
49. Id. at 74.
50. Id. at 96.
51. Id. An illuminating book collecting cases from the New York Admiralty
Court during the period 1715 to 1788 (and thus reported during the period of both the
vice-admiralty court and the state admiralty court) is C.HOUGH, REPORT OF CASES IN
THE VICE ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK AND IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1925). Originally printed by the Yale
University Press, it provides a window on the sort of work done by admiralty courts
during the 18th century. Although the book is now out of print, it is still available in
some libraries and through private collections. For an interesting comparison based on
the experiences of the early admiralty courts in Rhode Island, see Wiener, Notes on the
Rhode Island Admiralty, 46 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1932).
52. The term "prize" in an admiralty sense refers to a vessel which, because
of its enemy nature or unneutral conduct in wartime, is captured at sea and subse-
quently considered the property of the country that seized her. R. DE KERCHOVE,
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 607 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as DE
KERCHOVE].
According to a recent commentator, American courts have had little prize litigation
since the time of the Spanish American War, although a prize law still appears in the
national laws at 10 U.S.C. §§ 7651-81 (1982). J. LUCAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMIRALTY 137 (2d ed. 1978). For a somewhat recent discussion of prize law, see
Brown, World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restric-
tions on Neutral Shipping With Israel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1966).
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This system, however, never worked as intended. The states were
jealous of their powers, and few appeals were taken to the
Congress.5 3
The Confederation's dismal experience with the state maritime
courts fostered a widespread conviction that under any new plan of
government the admiralty jurisdiction ought to rest entirely with
the national government. Although there was substantial conflict
in the Convention and the First Congress as to the necessity or de-
sirability of establishing a system of inferior federal courts,5 4 once it
was determined that such courts ought to be established the admi-
ralty jurisdiction was ceded to them as a matter of course.5 5 In-
deed, some members of the First Congress, such as Samuel
Livermore of New Hampshire, argued that the federal courts
should only hear admiralty cases, leaving all other causes of actions
to be entertained by the state courts. 5 6 The end result was article
III, section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "cases of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction" are to be heard by the federal
courts.5 7 As has been noted by one commentator, the grant of ad-
53. ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at 1-2.
54. Id.
55. Writing in The Federalist Alexander Hamilton said of the decision to vest the
federal courts with responsibility for maritime matters that:
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the Judiciary authority of the
Union ought to extend to all those cases which originate on the high seas, and
are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. The admiralty jurisdiction will de-
mand little animadversion. The most bigoted idolizers of State authority, have
not thus far shown a disposition to deny the National Judiciary the cognizance
of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the law of nations, and so
commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considera-
tions which are relative to the public peace. The most important of them are,
by the present Confederation, submitted to Federal Jurisdiction.
A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST, no. 80, at 434, 437 (Scott ed. 1894), reprinted in
ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at 2 n.1.
56. ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at 2 n.2.
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Interestingly enough, article III does not define what
is a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. In the days of wooden ships and sails
this was probably not necessary since a ship, after all, was a ship. Today, however, the
matter has been complicated by the invention of seaplanes, hover-crafts, pleasure boats
and off-shore oil rigs. All of these have provoked countless cases, as well as law review
articles, as claimants attempt to bring their claims within the ambit of admiralty's fed-
eral jurisdiction. In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972), the United States Supreme Court attempted to bring some order to the situation
by holding that claims arising from airplane accidents occurring on navigable waters
would be cognizable in admiralty only when the wrong which was the gravamen of the
suit bore a significant relationship to "traditional" maritime activity. This requirement,
however, was recently capsized by the Court. In Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 457
U.S. 668 (1982), the Court was faced with a collision which involved two pleasure boats.
The district court had dismissed the suit, which had been brought under the federal
admiralty jurisdiction, because it found that the wrong complained of bore no relation-
ship to traditional maritime concerns. This was an entirely understandable position for
the lower court to take, since traditionally admiralty had been equated with commercial
shipping, as noted in the Executive Jet case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
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miralty jurisdiction to the federal courts is the only specific subject
matter grant of power to the federal judiciary.5 8
The statutory exclusivity of the admiralty jurisdiction did not en-
dure very long. Concurrent maritime jurisdiction in common law
versed the decision, however, and a bitterly divided Supreme Court affirmed. Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, explained that although the maritime activity in-
volved in Richardson was noncommercial in nature, still the need to subject all ship
operators to a uniform set of liability rules required that the case be heard in a federal
court sitting in admiralty.
Claimants barred access to the federal courts by the Executive Jet decision have, after
Richardson, been welcomed at the doors of the federal courthouse. See, e.g., Oliver v.
Hardesty, 745 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1984). Although the full ramifications of Richardson
are still unclear, this much seems to be certain. A claimant wishing to assert an admi-
ralty claim is entitled to have a federal court hear that claim under the court's admiralty
jurisdiction whenever the claimant is able to demonstrate either: 1) that the wrong
which gives rise to the suit is of a kind traditionally heard by admiralty courts; or, 2)
that the wrong requires a uniform solution in order to insure that maritime activity is
not disrupted.
58. ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at 1. From this specific recognition of admiralty
arose the practice of admiralty being treated differently from other fields of law. Per-
haps this is best illustrated by the fact that until 1966, admiralty enjoyed its own set of
procedural rules. Even after the incorporation of admiralty into the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a supplemental set of rules relating to admiralty continues in force.
For further information on the unification of the admiralty with the Federal Rules, see
Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed from the United States Courthouse: Or What Have
They Done to Admiralty?, 5 WILLAMErTE L.J. 367 (1969) and Note, Admiralty Practice
After Unification: Barnacles on the Procedural Hull, 81 YALE L. J. 1154 (1972).
Another area where admiralty practice has differed from the rest of the lav is in the
application of the constitutional requirement of notice before seizing the property of
another. In a series of cases in the 1970's, the Supreme Court increased the require-
ments of notice prior to seizure and the procedures to be followed after seizure. These
efforts culminated in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975). Admiralty courts, however, have not felt themselves governed by these proce-
dures because of the unique mobility of ships relative to other chattels. See, e.g., Schif-
fahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 732 F.2d 1543
(I lth Cir. 1984); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1982); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge General G. L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
Admiralty has historically been recognized as a specialty apart from the rest of the
law. See, e.g., interpretations of Canon 46 of the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 243 (1953). The new MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT drafted by the ABA explicitly recognize admiralty
as a specialty. Rule 7.4(b) entitled Communication of Fields of Practice, states that a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is a specialist except: "A lawyer engaged in
admiralty practice may use the designation 'Admiralty,' 'Proctor in Admiralty,' or a
substantially similar designation," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
7.4(b) (1981).
In explaining why such specialization is allowed with respect to admiralty the Rules
refer to EC 2-14 of the 1969 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, which
explained that the holding out of oneself as a specialist when engaged in admiralty
"historically has been permitted." It is interesting that the new Model Rules allow the
use of the term "Proctor in Admiralty." Prior to the unification of the Admiralty Rules
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, admiralty lawyers were actually
called proctors; suits were called libels; plaintiffs were libellants and defendants were
respondents. For the Model Rules, drafted in the 1980's, to continue to use the term
Proctor in Admiralty shows that, at least in the minds of other lawyers, admiralty law-
yers are practicing in a different ocean.
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courts was established in 1789 when the first Judiciary Act pro-
vided that the district courts would have exclusive original cogni-
zance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
"saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it.''59
It has been said, only half in jest, that the "savings to suitors,"
clause (as it became known) "has been the ultimate source of most
of the Federalism problems that have arisen in admiralty. ' 60 Be-
cause of this clause, a claimant is free to walk into the courthouse
on either side of the street, except in those rare instances where the
only remedy available arises under admiralty law.61 In practice,
however, almost all maritime claimants have preferred to walk into
the federal courthouse.62 Thus, despite the fact that doors of both
the state and federal courthouse were open to admiralty suitors, lit-
tle admiralty traffic came to the state courthouse.
If admiralty was generally confined to the federal courthouse be-
cause of the preference of litigants, the confinement of family law to
the state courts was the result of a decision by the federal judiciary
to close their doors to family law litigants.
The decision to close the federal courthouse came in a case
known as Barber v. Barber.63 In dictum, the United States Supreme
Court stated that: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the
courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery
or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and
board."' 64 Half a century later the Court was again called to speak
on the question in two divorce cases which were on appeal from
territorial courts. In Simms v. Simms, 65 the Arizona territorial
59. 1 Stat. 77 (1789). The clause is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982), which
provides that the federal courts have jurisdiction of: "(1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled."
60. ROBERTSON, supra note 46, at 18-19. ROBERTSON also contains an excellent
review of the drafting of the clause. Id. at 22-27.
61. Proceedings directly against the vessel, as opposed to her owners, can only be
brought in the federal courts, since the common law does not know the in rem action.
For an interesting state case in which the Supreme Court approved of an in rem pro-
ceeding going forth in state court, see Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943). In
that case the forfeiture of a net was upheld as a violation of the state gaming laws, a
traditional concern of the common law.
62. The usual reasons given are: the greater expertise of federal judges; the simpli-
fied practice procedures of the federal courts; the speedier resolution of disputes relative
to state courts; and the increased ease of enforcing federal judgments throughout the
country and in foreign nations.
63. 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
64. Id. at 584.
65. 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
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court had granted a decree of divorce with alimony. The Supreme
Court quoted Barber and stated that:
It may therefore be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit
Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction, either of suits
for divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for
divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree
for such alimony in a state court. Within the States of the
Union, the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State and
not to the laws of the United States.66
Similar language was used in the Court's disposition of De La
Rama v. De La Rama.67 The case involved an appeal from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines which had reversed a lower
court's decree granting the wife a divorce, division of property and
allowance for support. The Court wrote:
It has been a long established rule that the courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chan-
cery, or as incident of a divorce or separation, both by reason of
the fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of
different States so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule
which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the
further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuni-
ary value.68
It is important to note, however, that in both Simms and De La
Rama, the Court went on to hold that Barber did not apply. Both
cases arose from territorial courts. The Court held that where there
existed no state courts, the federal courts could hear family matters.
The Barber rationale was held not to be a bar because the govern-
ment of the United States has complete power to regulate the affairs
of the territories. 69 Other Supreme Court cases have held, however,
66. Id. at 167.
67. 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
68. Id. at 307.
69. The problem of how much power a territorial court could exercise, and on
what subjects it was free to exercise that power, is a continuing one. In dictum in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Supreme Court juxtaposed the powers
of territorial courts with regards to family and admiralty matters and concluded that
the territorial courts were free to rule on both. In support of its conclusion the Court
cited the Barber case for the power of the territorial courts to hear family matters and
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828) to show that territorial courts could
hear admiralty matters. 370 U.S. at 544, 545 n.14. Canter involved a salvage claim
decided by the Florida superior courts, which had been formed by the Congress before
Florida was a state. Salvage has always been considered a matter within the admiralty
jurisdiction. (Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240 (1804)). It was claimed that as a result
of salvage being within the admiralty jurisdiction, it had to be heard by an article III
judge who had been appointed for life. The Florida judges were appointed for terms of
four years. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the Florida territorial courts could hear admiralty claims because Congress was free,
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that in the normal situation a litigant would be barred from bring-
ing a divorce action in federal court.70 Nevertheless, some federal
appellate courts have recently begun to question whether the do-
mestic relations exception to the federal judiciary's subject matter
jurisdiction is correct.71
B. English Practice Relating to Deciding Cases Involving
Admiralty and Family Law
Doctors' Commons is situate in Great Knight-Rider-street, to
the south of St. Paul's Cathedral. It is the college of civilians,
where the civil law is studied and practised, and derives its name
from the civilians commoning together as in other colleges. Here
are kept the courts which have cognizance of injuries of an eccle-
siastical, military, and maritime nature.72
The foregoing description of Doctors' Commons, penned shortly
after the beginning of the nineteenth century, explains in a single
paragraph the historical relationship between admiralty and family
law in England. For it was in Doctors' Commons that the civilians,
lawyers versed in both the civil and canon law, passed on maritime
matters as well as family matters. 73 That an institution would have
made bedfellows out of family and admiralty law may seen remark-
where no state government existed, to create article I legislative courts to hear all claims
that might come before it. 26 U.S. at 546.
70. See, eg., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Ager, 280 U.S. 379 (1930). The whole sub-
ject of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is neatly presented in C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT]. Wright points out that although Popovici is often cited for the proposition
that federal courts have no power to hear domestic law issues, the facts of the case are
so unique that it is questionable to cite the case for that proposition. The Popovici deci-
sion actually turned on the fact that the husband was a foreign consul who denied that a
state court could try him because consular matters are made the constitutional preroga-
tive of the federal courts.
71. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim, Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1973); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3rd Cir. 1973). Although neither of those
cases held against the Supreme Court's position, both questioned the holding in opin-
ions which explore in detail the whole basis of the Barber decision.
72. R. ACKERMANN, MICROCOSM OF LONDON (1808), quoted in F. WISWALL,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800 75
(1970) [hereinafter cited as WISWALL.
73. Doctors' Commons was immortalized for all time in Charles Dickens' David
Copperfield. In Chapter 23 David has asked Steerforth what a proctor is. Steerforth
replies that:
I can tell you best what he is, by telling you what Doctors' Commons is. It's a
little out-of-the-way place, where they administer what is called ecclesiastical
law, and play all kinds of tricks with obsolete old monsters of Acts of Parlia-
ment, which three-fourths of the world know nothing about, and the other
fourth supposes to have been dug up, in a fossil state, in the days of the Ed-
wards. It's a place that has an ancient monopoly in suits about people's wills
and people's marriages, and disputes among ships and boats.
Dickens' description of the Doctors' Commons being a "little out-of-the-way" place is
wrong; however, the mistake is surely due to artistic license rather than ignorance be-
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able, especially in this day and age of intense specialization and sep-
aration. It is really quite comprehensible, however, once a few facts
fill in the historical picture.
To begin with, it should be remembered that the admiralty law
coming down from the Rhodians, is basically civil in nature. 74
Although its civil nature has now been diluted with the introduc-
tion of numerous statutes and centuries of Anglo-American juris-
prudence, much of its civil law flavor can still be discerned,
especially in such areas as salvage. 75 Thus, it became necessary in
England to have admiralty matters placed in the hands of lawyers
competent in the civil law.
Due to the strict requirements of the age, very few lawyers in
England were trained in the civil law. This was due, in part, to a
decision to keep the numbers of civil law trained lawyers artificially
low.76 Primarily, however, the small number of civil lawyers was
cause Dickens himself had been a free-lance reporter in Doctors' Commons for five
years. WISWALL, supra note 72, at 81 explained:
Architecturally, Doctors' Commons was evidently quite splendid. The "Great
Quadrangle" (of which there is a drawing in the London Museum) was en-
tered through an archway from Knightrider Street, and opposite was another
archway leading into a second quadrangle and garden. The buildings included
the dwellings and chambers of the advocates and the offices of the proctors
• . . the Common Hall, and an informal dining room, over which was a "spa-
cious and well-stocked" library.
74. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 1-3, at 8.
75. The Rhodians compiled a comprehensive maritime code several hundred years
before the coming of Christ. The code contained a section on salvage and, like salvage
law today, rewarded persons who salved property in danger while on the water. 3A
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 5, at 1-6-1-8 (Norris rev. ed. 7th ed. 1983). It must be
pointed out, however, that a number of commentators have criticized the notion that
the Rhodians created such a code. See Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian
Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223 (1909).
76. It is ironic that a feeling that there were too many lawyers existed in 16th and
17th century England, and that a conscious need was felt to erect barriers preventing
admission to the bar. State bars in late 20th century America have also been deluged by
lawyers, and in response many bar associations have attempted to keep out potential
lawyers by having the state supreme courts require that potential admittees meet strin-
gent residency requirements. While these requirements are often urged as necessary to
insure that lawyers from foreign jurisdictions will be versed in local law, the real reason
is less laudatory. In striking down New York's residency requirements, the court of
appeals wrote that: "durational residency requirements constitute protectionist trade
barriers for the economic protection of local interests [and] have given rise to numerous
calls to nationalize admission to the Bar." Matter of Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272 n.10,
397 N.E.2d 1309, 1313 n.10, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 n.10 (1979). The subject of residency
requirements has attracted attention at the highest levels of government, and has proved
to be a contentious thorn in United States-Japanese trade relations. See Haberman,
Japan Resisting U.S. Lawyers, The N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1984, at 28, col. 3. When the
issue reached the United States Supreme Court, that Court in line with state supreme
court decisions, struck down residency requirements in a 8 to 1 decision. Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, Civ. No. 83-1466 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985); see also
Greenhouse, Vermont Lawyer Wins in Residency Rule Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985,
at B5, col. 1. For interesting recent commentaries, written before the Supreme Court's
decision in the Piper case, see Greenhouse, Competition and Lawyers, The N.Y. Times,
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due to the vissicitudes of English history. Following his split with
the Roman Catholic Church, King Henry VIII established the
Anglican Church of England. As part of his effort to suppress Ro-
man theology, the King forbade the medieval canon lawyers from
continuing their practice of canon law, and abolished the canon law
faculties at Cambridge and Oxford Universities.77
Unable to now practice canon law, the former canonists turned to
the practice of civil law, itself a close cousin of canon law. These
civilians, as they became known, established a common college for
themselves at Cambridge. By 1511 their College had been formally
founded, and was known for the next two centuries by such titles as
the College of Civilians and the College of Advocates. In 1768, the
College received a Royal Charter under the official name of the Col-
lege of Doctors of Law, exercent in the Ecclesiastical and Admi-
ralty Courts. Long before this Charter was granted, however, the
body became informally known as Doctors' Commons, due to the
physical premises of the College.
In order for a candidate to be admitted to the College, he had to
first receive a doctorate in civil law from either Oxford or Cam-
bridge; a degree from another university would not gain him admis-
sion. The candidate then sought admission as an Advocate of the
Arches and Fellowship of the College. Admission as an Advocate
of the Arches was discretionary with the Archbishop of Canterbury
and an unfavorable decision by the Archbishop could not be ap-
pealed. Fellowship was granted upon the favorable vote of a major-
ity of the current Fellows.78
A lawyer admitted to Doctors' Commons was knowledgeable in
both civil and canon law. At Cambridge the doctorates of civil and
canon law were conferred together following a course of study that
took ten years to complete. The successful candidate received the
degree of LL.D. At Oxford the candidate went through a similar
period of study, although the degree conferred was the D.C.L.
Since family law matters were governed by church mores, the ci-
vilians were able to put their training in the fields of civil and canon
law to immediate use. Sir John Nicoll, for example, heard virtually
all of the admiralty and probate matters in England while serving
from 1833 to 1838 as Judge of the Admiralty. He also heard both
original and appellate ecclesiastical causes. 79
Doctors' Commons retained a prominent position until the mid-
Dec. 25, 1984, at 42, col. I and Stewart, You Can Practice HERE, but Not THERE, 71
A.B.A. J. 64 (Mar. 1985).
77. WISWALL, supra note 72, at 37-40.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 79.
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dle part of the nineteenth century, when a severe scandal sent the
institution into a speedy decline. 0 Within a decade a Royal Judica-
ture Commission, headed by Sir Robert Phillimore, 81 suggested that
further changes in the administration of the admiralty court were in
order. Although the Commission recommended far ranging
changes, 82 it recognized that advantages could be gained by joining
together the civil law courts. Thus, its report stated that "as re-
gards the Courts of Admiralty, Divorce and Probate, we think it
would be convenient that those Courts should be consolidated, and
form one Chamber or Division of the Supreme Court."
83
Four years after the release of the Royal Commission's report,
the Judicature Act of 1873, which established a Supreme Court of
Judicature, was enacted by the Parliament. 84 The Act created a
High Court of Justice as well as a Court of Appeal. Within the
High Court of Justice five separate divisions were established:
Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Chancery, and Pro-
bate, Divorce and Admiralty. The Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
division was often referred to as P.D.A. or, more simply, the Admi-
ralty Division, although some commentators, of an obviously more
humorous persuasion, would often call the P.D.A. the Division of
Wills, Wives and Wrecks.85
The structure of the 1873 Act lasted for nearly one hundred
years. In 1970, however, the admiralty jurisdiction of the High
Court was transferred to the Admiralty Court as part of the
Queen's Bench Division; the Probate and Divorce parts of the
P.D.A. were joined to form a new division known as the Family
Law Division. 86
80. The scandal, which came to light in November, 1853, involved the embezzle-
ment of 75,000 pounds from the coffers of the Admiralty Registry by Henry B. Swabey
while he was serving as the Admiralty Registrar. The affair shocked the Doctors' Com-
mons and by 1859 Serjeants, Barristers, Attorneys and Solicitors were admitted to the
practice of admiralty by the High Court of Admiralty Act of 1859. WISWALL, supra
note 72, ch. 3.
81. Sir Phillimore had more than a passing acquaintance with admiralty matters.
His father had been an Admiralty Advocate, a position which the younger Phillimore
reached in 1855. He had in the same year been appointed as Judge of the Admiralty
Court of the Cinque Ports, and, following the death of the great Admiralty Judge Dr.
Lushington, became Admiralty Judge and Dean of Arches. For Sir Phillimore's back-
ground and contributions to the development of English admiralty law see WIS\VALL,
supra note 72, at 96-97 and 112-15.
82. WISWALL, supra note 72, at 101.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 102. For those unfamiliar with the nautical meaning of the word
"wreck," it means a sunken vessel.
86. The reorganization came with the passage of the Administration of Justice Act
1970. Under section 2(1) of that Act, an Admiralty Court was constituted within the
Queen's Bench Division to take "Admiralty business." The term "Admiralty business"
was defined in the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 62 to involve the exercise of the High
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Interestingly, this development occurred within a short time of
the publication of a lengthy federal district court opinion which
questioned the Barber rule of the United States Supreme Court.87
While American courts were attempting to join family law to their
admiralty dockets, English courts were heading in the opposite
direction.
IV. COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHO
COULD BE A JONES ACT SURVIVING WIDOW
As the discussion in Part III of this Article illustrated, the deci-
sion to have American federal judges concentrate on admiralty mat-
ters while their state brethren decided family law cases was not the
result of a carefully thought out system; it was not designed to
achieve advantages such as division of workload or creation of spe-
cialized tribunals who, through constantly hearing one type of case,
would develop an expertise in handling a particular matter. Rather,
the decision was a product of historical accident, just as the decision
in England to combine the two specialties was likewise the result of
a historical accident. Nevertheless, in the United States the influ-
ence that this accident exerted on federal courts was clearly illus-
trated when it came time to decide questions of who could be a
surviving widow under the Jones Act.
The earliest decision on the question appears to have come from
the Fifth Circuit in Beebe v. Moormack Gulf Lines, Inc. 88 In that
case an oiler named Harrison Knighton was killed through the neg-
ligence of his ship's owners. 89 He was survived by a wife and child
and his mother in Arkansas, and by Marian Beebe, with whom he
had gone through a marriage ceremony some weeks before his
death. At the time of his accidental death he was living in New
Orleans with Marian, who did not know of his previous marriage.
Marian Beebe claimed to be the surviving widow of Harrison and
sought to recover under the Jones Act. The court held that she
could not recover because of the prior, undissolved marriage. In so
holding, the court wrote:
We feel sure than Congress did not contemplate the possibility of
a man leaving two lawful wives, or holding an employer to com-
pensate two women claiming to be such. No doubt, as is here
Court's Admiralty jurisdiction. See 2 CARVER'S, CARRIAGE BY SEA 1417 (R.
Colinvaux ed. 13th ed. 1982).
87. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), written by Judge, now
Chief Judge, Weinstein.
88. 59 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1932).
89. An oiler is an unlicensed member of the engine room staff who oils and greases
bearings and moving parts of the engines and supplies the proper grade of oil and
grease. DE KERCHOVE, supra note 52, at 547 and 337.
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contended, marriage with consequent wifehood is a matter of
state law, as the other relationships mentioned in this statute
have been held to be. . . . If there were such conflict in the mar-
riage laws of Arkansas and Louisiana, the two loci contractus
here involved, as to seem to result in this seaman having left two
wives, a difficult question might be presented, but the law of
Louisiana is that the undissolved prior marriage rendered the
ceremony in Louisiana with Marian Beebe null.90
The next case to touch the question was Lawson v. United
States.91 The case involved a statute known as the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA),92 which is a sister act to the Jones Act.93
DOHSA confers upon the personal representative of the decedent a
right to recover damages for the benefit of the decedent's wife. Like
the Jones Act, DOHSA does not define who is a wife. In Lawson,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
which had allowed a putative spouse94 to recover. In explaining its
reversal, the court wrote:
But the common meaning of "wife" is legal wife; and a bigamous
marriage does not make the defrauded and innocent woman a
"wife" in common parlance. The problem, of course, is to deter-
mine what meaning the legislators intended (or may be assumed
to have intended) to ascribe to the word "wife." And we see
nothing to suggest that they used the word in other than its nor-
mal meaning, or intended that a man could have two or more
wives all recovering at once under this statute.95
Shortly after Lawson was decided, the Eastern District Court of
90. 59 F.2d at 319-20 (citation omitted).
91. 192 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1951).
92. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) is codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68
(1982). It was passed by Congress on March 30, 1920, to provide a recovery for deaths
"caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State." A marine league is 6,075 yards long. DE
KERCHOVE, supra note 52, at 444. A third act which should be mentioned is the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, discussed supra note 23. Because
it does not deal with so-called "blue water" seamen, the problems of defining the mean-
ing of the word wife in the Act are not discussed in this Article. Once again, however,
federal admiralty courts have consistently looked to state law to supply the definition.
For a comprehensive discussion see Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d
1306 (5th Cir. 1979).
93. DOHSA is not identical to the Jones Act. DOHSA does not contain a survival
provision. More importantly, the possible beneficiaries under DOHSA are different
from those under the Jones Act. Section 761 of DOHSA provides that the personal
representative may recover benefits for the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child or
dependent relative. Thus, all dependent beneficiaries can share in a DOHSA award.
The Jones Act establishes three successive classes of beneficiaries: 1) spouse and chil-
dren; 2) parents; 3) dependent next of kin. See supra notes 12 and 44. In addition, the
existence of a prior class bars recovery on behalf of all members of any subsequent class.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-30, at 361. GILMORE & BLACK also explains
the often tortured relationship between DOHSA and the Jones Act. Id. at § 6-31.
94. The term "putative spouse" is defined infra note 105.
95. 192 F.2d at 480-81 (footnote omitted).
1985]
25
Jarvis: Rethinking the Meaning of the Phrase "Surviving Widow" in the Jon
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Pennsylvania was faced with a similar case under DOHSA. In Tet-
terton v. Arctic Tankers, Inc. ,96 the court ruled that the administra-
tix could not recover benefits because she had never consummated a
valid common law marriage with the decedent. 97 Although the ad-
ministratix had lived with decedent for five years and eventually
obtained an annulment of the first marriage, the law of New York,
the administratix's domicile, did not recognize common law mar-
riages. The couple had lived together at one point in Florida, which
did recognize common law marriages, but the court refused to look
to this alternative jurisdiction in order to permit recovery for the
administratrix. 98
It was against this background that the Fourth Circuit decided
the leading case of Bell v. Tug Shrike.99 In Tug Shrike the decedent
met his death when the Tug Shrike capsized in the Chesapeake Bay.
Mary Bell brought suit under the Jones Act to recover as a surviv-
ing widow.
The decedent had been married three times during his life. He
first married in 1940, and that marriage ended in divorce in June,
1951. One week later he entered into his second marriage. He and
his wife were separated in 1954, however, and a divorce decree was
issued on September 18, 1957. He married the claimant on Decem-
ber 13, 1956, and died on September 12, 1959.
The issue in the case then was whether the decedent's third mar-
riage in December, 1956, ever became legal, since at the time he was
married to his second wife. All of the parties agreed that the law of
Virginia would control if state law was applied. In addition, it was
further agreed that Virginia law did not recognize common law
marriages. As a result, the claimant argued that the federal courts
should fashion a rule of domestic relations rather than employing
the state rule. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the claim-
ant's contention, applied Virginia law, and denied Jones Act surviv-
ing widow status to Mary Bell.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion began by recognizing that there was
96. 116 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
97. The term "common law marriage" is defined infra note 104.
98. The claimant moved to Florida in 1943 and began living with the decedent.
Sometime prior to 1948 the couple moved to New York. New York had abolished
common law marriages by statute in 1933. In 1948, the claimant received an annulment
of her first marriage. Although the court was unwilling to allow the decree to be relate
back, the court was not completely unsympathetic to the claimant's plight. The court
did attempt to find another jurisdiction with which the couple had contacts which al-
lowed common law marriages. The court wrote that such a jurisdiction could not be
found because: "[T]here is no proof that Maria and Tetterton were domiciled at any
time in any state which permits common-law marriages. Virginia, where she and Tet-
terton visited his relatives, does not." 116 F. Supp. at 432.
99. 332 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1964).
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no admiralty law defining the phrase "surviving widow." In such
circumstances, the court said, the correct approach would be to de-
cide whether it would be better to fashion an admiralty rule or
adopt an existing rule from a non-maritime context. "0 Finding it
wiser to adopt rather than create, the court wrote that:
Appellant maintains that admiralty has a choice of law and that,
if the application of state law would undermine a federal right,
the court should look to that law which will best effectuate admi-
ralty principles and achieve the national uniformity that is desir-
able in this area. She urges that these fundamental principles
would be better satisfied by accepting her as a common-law wife
instead of depriving her of that status by resort to the domestic
relations laws of Virginia. . . . Emphatically we must decline to
accept the appellant's contention that by applying the law of Vir-
ginia to interpret the term "surviving widow" in the Jones Act, a
federal right is being defeated by the state. There can be no fed-
eral right unless the claimant can qualify as a beneficiary under
the statute. Under the circumstances this can only be achieved
through a lawful marriage as that term is interpreted in the only
available domestic relations law-the law of the domicile.101
The question appeared again seven years later in McPherson v.
S/S South African Pioneer.10 2 Since the case was heard by the same
trial judge who had decided Tug Shrike,10 3 the result was a foregone
conclusion. The case is interesting, however, for in it counsel for
100. The question whether, in situations where there were no admiralty precedents
available, federal courts were to fashion a precedent or look to land based cases had
been argued in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). See also
supra note 40. The question in Wilburn was whether an insurer could assert as a com-
plete defense to a claim made on a houseboat which had been lost, that its insured had
failed to live up to the warranties contained in the insurance policy. The lower courts
held that such a defense was valid, and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court re-
versed, arguing that there was no settled view on the question. The Court then held
that because the question did not require a uniform answer, the federal courts should
apply the applicable state insurance law to decide if the defense was valid.
Wilburn is a remarkable opinion for several reasons. First, the issue had been decided
eighty years before in Insurance Co. v. Thwing, 80 U.S. 672 (1871). Thus, there was
really no reason for the Court to decide the case. Either unaware of or unimpressed by
the Thwing decision, however, the Wilburn Court decided its case without reference to
and in a way directly oposite to Thwing. The second reason why the Wilburn case is
remarkable is that it has spawned a healthy amount of litigation because of the uncer-
tainties it caused. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 2-8, at 71. Finally, Wilburn has
been taken as the rallying call for all those who favor increased state regulation over
maritime matters, in contrast to the call for uniformity found in the Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) see supra note 23. The recent decision of the Court
in Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. 668 (1982) see supra note 57, must, how-
ever, be taken as a rebuff to the vitality of Wilburn.
101. 332 F.2d at 331-32, 336-37. The Fourth Circuit's opinion relies heavily on
Wilburn. Id. at 332.
102. 321 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Va. 1971).
103. Walter E. Hoffman. Judge Hoffman was sitting as Chief Judge of the Eastern
District when he heard both cases. Those interested in the career of Judge Hoffman,
who has now assumed Senior Judge status, are directed to 588 F. Supp. LXXXIV-XCI
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the claimant argued that his client should be found to be a Jones
Act surviving widow either because she had a common law mar-
riage with the decedent, I°4 under the laws of South Carolina, or
because she was a "putative spouse."' 10 5 The court rejected the for-
mer because the couple had never lived together in South Carolina
and because the legal impediment to the common law marriage was
not removed until after the decedent's death.10 6 But as to the latter,
the court held that the claimant could not be a putative spouse be-
cause she knew at the time of her marriage to the decedent that he
was not free to marry her.107 Although the court did not say what
its decision would have been had it found that the claimant was
truly ignorant of the legal impediment, its decision certainly leaves
open the possibility that a putative spouse who is innocently una-
ware of a legal impediment could be a Jones Act surviving widow.
After McPherson came Hamilton v. Canal Barge Company.10 8
The court denied recovery to a seaman's fiancee by asserting that:
"[N]either DOHSA, the Jones Act, nor state death actions recog-
nize as a beneficiary anyone other than a relative."10 9 The issue was
(1984), which recounts his career on the occasion of his acceptance of the Edward J.
Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award.
104. Exactly what constitutes a "common law marriage" is hard to say, because the
term has been used loosely by legislatures. It sometimes means a relationship having all
of the incidents of a ceremonial marriage. At other times, however, it is merely a de-
scriptive term for a meretricious relationship. See W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 130 (3d ed. 1978).
105. Under the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209 (1973), which was
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1974, a putative spouse is defined to be:
Any person who has cohabited with another to whom he is not legally married
in the good faith belief that he was married to that person is a putative spouse
until knowledge of the fact that he is not legally married terminates his status
and prevents acquisition of further rights. A putative spouse acquires the
rights conferred upon a legal spouse, including the right to maintenance fol-
lowing termination of his status, whether or not the marriage is prohibited
(Section 207) or declared invalid (Section 208). If there is a legal spouse or
other putative spouses, rights acquired by a putative spouse do not supersede
the rights of the legal spouse or those acquired by other putative spouses, but
the court shall apportion property, maintenance, and support rights among
the claimants as appropriate in the circumstances and in the interests of
justice.
It is important to remember that the term "putative spouse" is a descriptive one, and
confers no rights of its own force. It only provides entitlements if a statute adopts a
legal definition of a putative marriage, as has, for example, been done in California and
Louisiana. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4452, 4455 (West 1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 117,
118 (West 1952).
106. 321 F. Supp. at 46.
107. Id. at 46.
108. 395 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1975). The Hamilton case was disapproved of on
other grounds in Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982), op. withdrawn,
722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Schmidt v. Byrd, 52 U.S.L.W. 3907
(U.S. June 19, 1984) (No. 83-1749) and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culver, 105
S. Ct. 90 (1984).
109. 395 F. Supp. at 987. The court further stated:
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next heard in the same district which had heard the Tug Shrike and
South African Pioneer suits.110 In Ford v. The American Original
Corporation,I' an action was brought under the Jones Act by a wo-
man who had lived with the decedent, a seaman, for some years
prior to his death which occurred while he was performing repair
work on a vessel. Although clearly not married to the decedent, the
claimant had received some support from the decedent. Relying on
both Tug Shrike and South African Pioneer, the court held that the
claimant was not a surviving widow because here there was not
even a hint of a marriage, and because Virginia, the domicile state,
did not recognize common law marriages.
In 1981 the Fourth Circuit found itself faced with a case which
was "truly one of first impression." Byrd v. Byrd' 12 involved a suit
by a wife against a husband' 3 for injuries sustained as a result of
the husband's negligence in maintaining his pleasure boat in a sea-
worthy state. The question posed by the case was whether the
wife's admiralty claim was barred by the doctrine of interspousal
immunity.
Virginia was the situs of the accident and, at the relevant time,
Death is a rupture in the social fabric. It causes loss to many, fiances and
neighbors, to friends, to organizations to which the decedent belonged, to
charities he may have supported, and in individual cases to many others who
may have loved the deceased and been seriously affected by his death. But
statutes granting a right to recover for the loss occasioned by death have al-
ways been limited to relatives, and, as we have seen, in some instances only to
those who were also dependents.
No one can doubt that Ms. Dunn was injured by Mr. Hamilton's death, or
that the entire course of her life has been altered. But she was not a relative;
hence she may not be awarded money damages for the grievous hurt she has
suffered.
Nor can damages be awarded her on the basis that the defendants caused her
fiancee to breach his promise of marriage. No attempt need be made to ascer-
tain whether state law or federal law should determine the liability for an
interference with such a relationship by breach of a duty imposed by the mari-
time law. Louisiana does not recognize any action for interference with con-
tractual relations,. . . and the maritime law does not recognize an action for
negligent interference with a contractual relationship.
Id. (citations omitted).
110. The Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. See supra notes 99-107 and
accompanying text.
111. 475 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Va. 1979).
112. 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). The Byrd case is discussed in Note, Maritime
Law-Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity Held Inapplicable Within FederalAdmiralty Ju-
risdiction, 12 U. BALT. L. Rnv. 179 (1982).
113. Of course, such suits are rarely, if ever, accurately described by saying that the
wife is suing the husband or that the husband is suing the wife. As seems well known,
what is usually going on is that the injured spouse is bringing an action so as to reach
into the pockets of the other spouse's insurance company. Indeed, in Newton v. Weber,
119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (1922), the court explicitly stated that no wife would
want to sue her husband for a negligent tort except as a raid on an insurance company.
Be that as it may, the last decade has seen a rapid decline in the number of states which
prevent one spouse from suing the other.
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Virginia law recognized interspousal immunity as a complete de-
fense. 114 The defendant-husband raised the defense, and the federal
trial judge dismissed the case. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the
plaintiff-wife argued that to apply Virginia law of interspousal im-
munity would be to defeat an otherwise meritorious maritime cause
of action.11 5 The circuit court agreed, and reversed the lower
court's decision. The concerns for uniformity of federal admiralty
law and for maintaining meritorious maritime causes of action mo-
tivated the court's decision to apply federal common law rather
than state law. In finding for the plaintiff, the court wrote:
Clearly, reference to state law in deciding maritime tort suits be-
tween a husband and wife will not lead to uniform decisions. Ad-
ditionally, it is the standards of maritime law which measures
rights and liabilities arising from conduct occurring on vessels on
the navigable waters. .... Therefore, application of a state's law
on interspousal immunity, if that state does not permit suits be-
tween spouses arising out of negligent torts, . . . would operate
to defeat a substantial admiralty right of recovery. 116
The court distinguished its holding in Byrd from that in Tug
Shrike by writing that Tug Shrike:
[D]oes not mandate the application of state law in the instant
case. There, this Court was faced with the question of whether a
woman, "married" to a seaman in an invalid ceremony, qualified
as a "surviving widow" for purposes of receiving benefits after
the seaman's death under the Jones Act. The Court determined
that there was no federal definition of "widow" either in the stat-
ute at issue or generally. In addition, the Court cited a number
of cases involving other federal statutes where availability of
some benefit turned on the familial status of the person claiming
the benefit and noted that courts, including the Supreme Court,
had repeatedly looked to state law to determine whether the
claimant possessed the necessary status. The Court therefore
held that it should apply state law rather than fashion a federal
law of domestic relations .... 117
With clarity which is visited only upon appellate judges, the Fourth
Circuit found a distinction between the instant case and Tug
114. According to the court's opinion, Virginia abolished the ban on interspousal
tort suits during the pendency of the suit. As the court realized, this would have
presented the interesting question, had the court chosen to apply Virginia law, as to the
controlling law, i.e., would the old or the new law govern the case? The court found it
unnecessary to reach the question. 657 F.2d at 617 n.5.
115. Plaintiff's case was based on three grounds: negligence; negligent violation of
the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982); and negligent
violation of the Inland Navigation Rules, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-207 (1982). 657
F.2d at 616 n.3. A useful book which discusses the duties of an owner of a pleasure boat
is M. NORRIS, YOUR BOAT & THE LAW (1965).
116. 657 F.2d at 618 (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 619 (footnotes omitted).
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Shrike. 18
Next came Weyer v. ABC Charters, Inc.1 19 The case was brought
under DOHSA by a divorced dependent widow of a seaman and
provided the court with a clear opportunity to fashion an admiralty
law of domestic relations. The offer was soundly rejected:
Plaintiff Shaw, citing the "humanitarian policy of the maritime
law" applied in Sealand Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, argues that to
restrict recovery for wrongful death to spouses, children and de-
pendant relatives would unjustly exclude a large number of bene-
ficiaries who are truly dependent upon the decedent and who
suffer a pecuniary loss. In so suggesting, plaintiff invites the
court to fashion a federal common law of beneficiaries apart
from the authorities above cited. This invitation must be
declined. 120
The most recent case to take up the issue comes from a trial court
in the Fifth Circuit. In Tidewater Marine Towing v. Curran-Hous-
ton, Inc.,121 the Eastern District of Louisiana reaffirmed the rule
that a common law spouse does not have a cause of action for death
arising under the Jones Act.12 2 The case involved the death of
118. Id. at 619-20. It is submitted that the distinction is unsatisfactory at best and
nonexistent at worst. In both cases there was no admiralty precedent to guide the court.
The court was, therefore, free to either apply a state law or fashion a federal common
law approach. How the court came out on the issue would decide whether the plaintiff
was able to recover compensation through a federal piece of legislation. Discussions of
whether the remedy or the right came first seem extremely metaphysical, especially
once one considers how outcome determinative the approach is.
119. 558 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
120. Id. at 366-67 (citation omitted). The court further stated:
The question of who is entitled to recover as a beneficiary for wrongful
death under the general maritime law was recently considered in Glod v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1982). In Glod
the court determined whether a decedent's nondependent siblings were enti-
tled to maintain an action for wrongful death under the general maritime law.
Id. at 185. In an excellent opinion, Judge Weigel summarized the remedy for
wrongful death and concluded that DOHSA provided an appropriate guide in
determining the proper beneficiaries in a general maritime wrongful death ac-
tion. Id. at 186. Since DOHSA did not allow a decedent's nondependent
siblings to recover, Judge Weigel found the decedent's nondependent relatives
were not eligible to maintain an action for wrongful death. Id.
The Glod rationale is most persuasive when applied to the analogous issues
herein. Using DOHSA as the appropriate guide, the Court concludes that
dependent divorced wives are not entitled to recover for wrongful death under
the general maritime law. Hence, Mrs. Shaw cannot maintain her action for
wrongful death. Accordingly, Penn Yan's motion for summary judgment of
dismissal is granted.
121. 1984 AM. MAR. CAS. at 2760 (E.D. La. 1983). The case does not appear to
have been officially reported.
122. The court found that the Jones Act employer of the decedent was not negligent,
and that the only defendant who was still involved in the litigation was the Dow Chemi-
cal Company against whom the claimant had brought a negligence action under the
general maritime law. Such suits have been permitted since the Supreme Court decided
Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Prior to the Moragne deci-
sion, such suits were barred because of an unfortunate precedent known as The Harris-
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Daniel Dupre, who was burned to death while working aboard a
ship which struck the Dow Pipeline in Louisiana.123
The court first found that under the laws of those states which
recognize common law marriages, the claimant would have been
considered a common law wife. 124 The court then found, however,
that Louisiana, where the accident occurred, did not recognize
common law marriages. Based on this, the court ruled against the
claimant. In explaining its decision, the court wrote:
The testimony in regard to the relationship between Dupre and
Vicknair demonstrated a close relationship. In fact, Dupre listed
Vicknair as his beneficiary on a life insurance policy he obtained
through Tidewater. The parties held themselves out to the com-
munity as man and wife and were treated by the community as
such. That the parents or brother of Daniel Dupre knew that the
couple was not technically married does not detract from the sta-
tus the couple attained in the community.
This Court is not ready to abandon the goal of uniformity
which Moragne dictated we seek, but nevertheless finds that the
common-law spouse should not have a cause of action for death
under the general maritime law. Those arguing in favor of such
a cause of action point out that in today's society, it is not unu-
sual for couples to cohabit without the benefit of marriage. No
sociological study is required to confirm that our mores today
burg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) which held that no cause of action for wrongful death was
provided by the general maritime law. The reasoning of The Harrisburg was based on
Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878), which held that the common law did
not provide a recovery for wrongful death. The harshness of The Harrisburg holding
was gradually cut away. First, the Court held in The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907)
that a recovery for wrongful death was available in admiralty cases by applying a state
wrongful death statute. Next, Congress enacted the Death on the High Seas Act, the
Jones Act and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. All three
acts provided for recovery based on injury, and the Jones Act and Death on the High
Seas Act also provided for recovery based on wrongful death. Thus, a unanimous Court
in Moragne could find no reason to allow The Harrisburg to continue to sail. For a
useful and up-to-date guide to the foregoing, see J. HOOD & B. HARDY, HANDBOOK OF
SEAMEN'S DAMAGES FOR DEATH AND INJURY (1983).
Returning now to Tidewater, the only party left to be sued for negligence was the
Dow Chemical Company. Although plaintiff asserted a Moragne-type claim against
Dow, the court found that the outcome would have been no different if the plaintiff had
been able to assert a Jones Act claim. 1984 AM. MAR. CAS. at 2764 n.7. Thus, the case,
which cites all of the Jones Act cases discussed in this Article, can be said to be the
latest chapter on the issue of who may qualify as a surviving widow under the Jones
Act.
123. The nature of the Dow pipeline is explained by the Court at 1984 AM. MAR.
CAs. at 2760-61. The pipeline was used to carry high pressure gas. When the tug on
which the decedent was working ruptured the pipeline, the immediate result was a large
explosion and fire which engulfed the tug.
124. The court found that the prerequisites to a common law marriage in those
states which still recognize such marriages are: (1) capacity of the parties to marry; (2)
a present marriage agreement between the parties; and, (3) holding out to the public as
man and wife. The court found that the claimant satisfied each of these requirements.
1984 AM. MAR. CAs. at 2765.
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are not those of yesteryear-indeed couples do often cohabit
without benefit of marriage. However, as often as not, in today's
society unmarried couples live together without attempting to
hold themselves out as husband and wife in the community.
Thus, to accept the argument that one who cohabits with an-
other should be granted a recovery for death of their roommate
under the general maritime law as being responsive to the needs
of society, because the survivor indeed suffers loss, both pecuniary
and otherwise, is to open the flood gates of litigation to all of
those who live together, whether or not their union meets the
definition of a common law marriage. Should all who cohabit
have a cause of action? Where would it end? Why wouldn't a
"best friend" who hasn't cohabited with the deceased but who
also suffers loss as a result of the death likewise have a cause of
action? Why not an uncle, an aunt, or next-door neighbor?
I do not think a court can conclude in most cases whether or
not the decision to not marry is a mere inadvertence or perceived
lack of significance of the marriage contract, or is, on the other
hand, a calculated, well thought out decision based on the fact
that one or both of the individuals find it a disadvantage to be
formally married . ... Indeed, in the case at bar, this Court
cannot tell whether Debra Vicknair and Daniel Dupre, though
having the capacity to marry and holding themselves out to the
public to be man and wife, consciously avoided contracting a
legal marriage, or whether they thought a ceremony was merely
an unnecessary formality. 125
V. THE PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH IN
DETERMINING WHO IS A JONES ACT SURVIVING
WIDOW
As the foregoing review of cases illustrate, no court has yet held a
common law or putative spouse to be entitled to collect under the
Jones Act as a surviving widow. The objections voiced by the cases
can be isolated into the following propositions:
1) A belief that state law must be looked to determine who is a
surviving widow;
2) A fear that defendants would be subject to a multitude of
claims;
3) Concern that enlarging the scope of the entitlement would
bring about a vast increase in litigation;
4) An adherence to stare decisis, under which only the Supreme
Court could change the rule announced in Seaboard Air Line v.
Kenney.
When these concerns are carefully analyzed, they simply do not
stand up.
Consider the first one, which is the belief that state law is the only
125. 1984 AM. MAR. CAs. at 2765-66.
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source of domestic relations law. As has been pointed out, the fact
that family law has been left for state courts is a product of acci-
dent. In England, admiralty matters and family matters were, until
quite recently, heard by the same court. In recent years, American
federal trial and appellate courts have increasingly questioned the
correctness of the rule which disclaims a federal right to hear di-
vorce matters. Thus, while at one time state law may have been the
only source of domestic relations law, such cannot be said to be true
today. Of course, even the Supreme Court has held that in cases
arising from territorial courts the United States could act upon fam-
ily law matters.
The second fear is that defendants would be subject to a multi-
tude of claims. This need not be a problem. If the court finds that
there are two or more claimants who are entitled to receive Jones
Act damages, there is no reason why the defendant must pay two
recoveries. Rather, the court can order the payment of a single
lump sum, and then divide the damages by apportioning them be-
tween the claimants. Although flexibility would have to be allowed
in determing the apportionment, the likely apportionment scheme
would look to factors such as how long each claimant had lived
with the decedent, how dependent each claimant was on the dece-
dent either at the time of death or during the period spent with the
claimant, and what other sources of support existed to provide for
each claimant.
The third concern is that the floodgates of litigation will be
opened. This is simply not true. The death of a seaman normally
results in one lawsuit wherein all of the potential beneficiaries ap-
pear and raise all of their claims. By enlarging the scope of the
phrase "surviving widow," such cases will have one, or at most two,
additional parties to already existing litigation. All other lawsuits
would be barred by res judicata. Defendants and courts need not
worry about additional lawsuits being brought.
On a related point, there is the legitimate question of where the
line should be drawn. In the Tidewater case, Judge McNamara
worried that aunts, uncles and next-door neighbors would come for-
ward. 126 This fear is unfounded. The Jones Act provides a list of
beneficiaries who may recover: widows and husbands, then chil-
dren, then parents and finally next of kin actually dependent on the
decedent. 127 Thus, even under an enlarged definition of the term
"surviving widow," an uncle or an aunt would be barred unless the
distribution came down to dependent next of kin and the uncle or
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 12 and 43.
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aunt qualified as such kin. By the same reasoning the next-door
neighbor would also be eliminated.
The final concern as is expressed in the case law, is that any
change should come from the United States Supreme Court, which
began the ball rolling by looking to state law in the Seaboard
case. 128 The need to wait for the Supreme Court to act is misplaced.
In the first place, it may be years, if ever, before a case presents the,
Court with an opportunity to reverse itself.12 9 Second, lower courts
have already shown themselves willing and able to act without
Supreme Court initiative in other matters relating to the application
of the Jones Act. 130 Third, an earlier error in judgment should not
be allowed to continue to exist while it is hoped that the Supreme
Court will eventually take action. The better course, and certainly
the more humanitarian course, is to begin to correct the mistake
immediately.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
As has been shown in the foregoing section of this Article, all of
the concerns usually expressed about widening the class of benefi-
ciaries entitled to damages under the Jones Act are fallacious. It is
128. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
129. As is well known, the denial of a certiorari petition is the norm, rather than the
exception, and no view is expressed by the Supreme Court by a decision to deny certio-
rari. Thus, even if a case with proper facts was to be offered, there would be no assur-
ance that it would receive the four votes necessary to be heard. During the period 1958
to 1968 approximately 13% of the cases (excluding cases involving indigent persons
who are almost always prisoners seeking reviews of their sentences) tendered to the
Supreme Court were accepted by the Court. In the 1971 Term, however, only 8.9% of
the cases seeking certiorari received it. In the 1980 Term the figure was 10.6%. The
whole matter is discussed at length in WRIGHT, supra note 70, § 108, at 756.
130. In re Industrial Transp. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) involved a
limitation petition proceeding brought by the owners of the M/V MICHAEL B. The
vessel had caught fire and exploded at dock, killing a seaman. The mother of children
said to be offspring of the deceased seaman sought to intervene the action so as to
collect Jones Act benefits for the children.
Since the Jones Act does not define who are children entitled to collect its benefits, a
question arose whether the children in the present case were children for the purpose of
the Jones Act. The court, following the ruling of Tug Shrike, held that it had no choice
but to look to state law. Under New York state family law, illegitimate children could
only be acknowledged as having been children of the alleged father if an order of filia-
tion had been entered during the lifetime of the father. In the case at bar, no such order
had been entered. The court thereupon reached out and decided to apply the New York
State Workmen's Compensation law, under which mere acknowledgment by the father
would suffice to settle the question of the child's parentage. The court stated that this
result was in accord with the beneficient purposes of the Congress in enacting legislation
such as the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act for the protection of seamen
and their families.
The decision represents laudable creativity, since none of the four sets of attorneys in
the case had suggested that the court look to the Workmen's Compensation law. It is to
be expected that such creativity would also be applied in cases requiring the court to
determine whether a wifely relationship existed between the decedent and the claimant.
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therefore recommended that the phrase "surviving widow" in the
Jones Act be enlarged to include all those persons who either were
the wife of the decedent at the time of the decedent's death, or who
were engaged in a relationship which could be characterized as
wifely in nature. What would constitute such a relationship would
be left to be worked out by the courts.131 In administering the en-
larged definition, the Courts first duty would be to interpret the
definition liberally with a healthy respect for the unique role that
admiralty courts have played as guardians of seamen and their de-
pendents. If the following factors were present, however, they
would weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion that the claimant was
engaged in a wifely relationship:
1) the establishment and maintenance of a common household
between the decedent and claimant;
2) the claimant bearing children which were the offspring of the
decedent;
3) decedent providing financial support for the claimant;
4) claimant providing financial support for the decedent;
5) the decedent and the claimant holding out to the community
that they were man and wife;
6) proof of acts by the decedent showing a degree of affection
normally reserved for a member of one's immediate family, in-
cluding naming the claimant as a beneficiary under a life insur-
ance policy, putting the claimant through college or graduate
school, paying the claimant's extraordinary medical bills follow-
ing a serious injury or accident, etc.
In administering this enlarged definition of a surviving widow,
courts would be free to set their own guidelines limiting recoveries.
The following suggested factors should be weighed for the smooth
administration of these cases:
1) a defendant found guilty of negligence and thus liable under
the Jones Act would not have his liability increased simply be-
cause more than one claimant had been found entitled to collect
damages under the Act. The court would first set the damages as
if only one claimant had been certified;
2) where two or more claimants have been certified as having
been engaged in a wifely relationship with the decedent, any ben-
efits to be collected from the defendant would be shared by the
claimants;
3) factors to be considered in apportioning benefits among enti-
tled claimants would include, but not be limited to:
a) the number of children each claimant was responsible
131. What is envisioned is that the courts would provide a common sense meaning
to the term "wifely relationship." Such an approach was expressly approved by the
United States Supreme Court in deciding which provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act should be carried over to the maritime field. See supra note 40.
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for, whether or not such children were the children of the
decedent;
b) the amount of financial need each claimant could
demonstrate, along with the amount of other sources of
income;
e) the length of time each claimant had spent in a wifely
relationship with the decedent;
d) the amount of support provided by the decedent to the
claimant;
e) any other factors which might establish how the dece-
dent would have divided the damages among the claimants.
CONCLUSION
The Jones Act was passed by Congress sixty-Ave years ago in
order to provide seamen and their families with protection against
the rigors and dangers of shipboard life. Since the days when the
Jones Act became law, however, American society has changed dra-
matically. Today it is common to find that seamen, like others, are
entering into relationships without the aid of a formal marriage cer-
emony. These relationships are no less important than those rela-
tionships which do have the benefit of a formal marriage license.
If the Jones Act is to fulfill its beneficient purposes of protecting
seamen and their families, and if the courts are to live up to their
historical role as guardians of seamen, the interpretation of the
phrase "surviving widow" must be expanded to include those wo-
men who have had a "wifely relationship" with the deceased sea-
man. 132 Such an enlarged definition should come about by the
courts departing from their traditional adherence to state family
132. One interesting question which has not arisen to date, but which conceivably
could be pressed under the enlarged definition of surviving widow suggested here, is
whether a homosexual lover could recover for the death of a gay seaman. As will be
recalled, FELA provides that the personal representative may bring an action for the
employee's wife or husband. See supra note 34. Should a gay lover be deemed a wife or
husband able to claim under the Jones Act? The subject of homosexual marriages has
caused considerable controversy over the years. Courts have routinely denied the abil-
ity of homosexual partners to "marry" one another. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.
App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) for the classic rationales against such marriages.
Courts have also refused to allow homosexual partners to use marital substitutes such as
adoption to formalize their union. See In re Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 481
N.Y.S.2d 654 (1984). Some commentators, however, have argued that same-sex mar-
riages are valid. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 83 YALE L.J. 573
(1973). Under the proposal contained in this Article, courts would be free to recognize
such marriages, although they would not have to. It is suggested, however, that the
tests laid out in this Article should be applied in a sex-blind manner. Not only would
such an application further the admiralty courts historical role of guardian, see supra
note 16, but it would also take cognizance of the reality that seamen, just like others in
our society, do engage in homosexual relationships. For cases involving homosexual
seamen, see Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 221 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 862 (1956) and Berg v. Claytor, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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law definitions.13 3 In place of state law, federal courts134 should de-
velop a federal law of domestic relations13 5 along the lines suggested
in this Article. 136 With the prospect that more and more seamen
133. Congress has left many gaps in the admiralty statutes that it has passed, begin-
ning with the grant of admiralty jurisdiction contained in article III. See supra note 57.
These gaps have traditionally been filled in by the admiralty courts. One of the rare
cases where the Supreme Court refused to allow lower federal courts to work out the
admiralty law was Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
282 (1952). The Court refused to give a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors,
stating that it was up to the Congress to take that step. The result of this ill-starred
decision has been that the issue has remained unsettled. As the reader has by now no
doubt already guessed, Congress never did say whether it favored or opposed contribu-
tion. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 20, § 6-55, at 442 n.363. For an update on
the Halcyon case, see Villareal, Halcyon to Ryan to Weyerhouser to Cooper-Where Do
We Go From Here? 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 593 (1975).
134. It should be pointed out that the two most important admiralty courts in the
nation-after the Supreme Court-have not yet ruled on the issue of who can be a
surviving widow under the Jones Act. Both the Second Circuit, which includes the Port
of New York, and the Ninth Circuit, whose jurisdiction extends to the Ports of Los
Angeles and San Francisco, have yet to rule on the issue.
135. It must be noted that the Supreme Court in other contexts has declared that a
federal lav of domestic relations should not be created. See, e.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1956), where the Court held that whether an illegitimate child could
succeed to the renewal rights of his deceased father under the federal Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 203, 301 (1982) was to be determined under state, not federal law. Whether
this case is still good law following the Court's recent decisions on illegitimacy is open
to question. See supra note 44. The issue has also come up in deciding who is a spouse
entitled to Social Security benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1982). Once again,
state law has been looked to. It is suggested that two responses could be given to these
precedents. The better approach, and the easier to administer, would be to say that
there is a federal law of domestic relations whenever a federal right, question, or juris-
diction is present. The narrower approach would be to make an explicit distinction for
admiralty, based on the long practice of providing seamen with special protection and
the equally long practice of treating admiralty as apart from other fields of law. See
supra notes 16 and 58, respectively.
136. In the Tug Shrike case the Fourth Circuit specifically refused to take the step of
expanding the definition of the term surviving widow. In particular, it wrote that:
Whether it would be sounder social policy to relax the statutory requirement
of widowhood by treating the survivior of a bigamous marriage as a widow
entitled to recovery is a fairly debatable question. But should such a change in
policy be made on judicial initiative? It is one thing for admiralty to fill in the
lacunae left by congressional silence; it would be quite another to rewrite the
statute. It seems to us that an admiralty court would overstep proper limits if
it should attain the result by giving a forced and artificial definition to the
well-established term "widow."
332 F.2d at 336.
Several rebuttals should be made to the above statement. First, the disastrous results
which follow the decision by admiralty courts to await congressional action on an area
of specific concern are well known. See supra note 133. In any event, it has been
twenty years since the Tug Shrike case was decided and Congress has neither explicitly
approved or disapproved of the result reached in that case, despite the fact that Con-
gress did amend the Jones Act in 1982. See supra note 2. Although some might argue
that Congress' failure to comment on the issue is proof of its contentment with the
decision, it is poor practice to infer acceptance from legislative silence.
The second rebuttal is that, although the term widowhood may have had an estab-
lished meaning in 1964 that excluded women who did not have a valid ceremonial mar-
riage, the changes in our society have made it desirable, if not necessary, to rethink what
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will enter into relationships without the benefit of a marriage li-
cense, 137 the creation of a federal law of domestic relations is imper-
ative if justice is to be fully served.
a widow is. Indeed, an increasing number of persons are entering into alternative life
style arrangements based on relationships other than marriage. See Kay & Amyx, Mar-
vin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937, 973-77 (1977) and sources
cited therein.
137. Seamen, of course are just as likely as any other occupational group to enter
into these alternative relationships. Indeed, if popular literature is to be believed, they
may be more likely to do so. Consider the following verses:
In every mess, I find a friend,
In every port a wife.
CH
They'll tell thee sailors, when away,
In every port a mistress find.
ARLES DIBDIN, JACK IN His ELEMENT.
N GAY, SWEET WILLIAMS' FARENVELL.
A seafaring man may have a sweetheart in every port; but he should steer
clear of a wife as he would avoid a quicksand.
SMOLLETT, THE ADVENTURES OF SIR LAUNCELOT
GREAVES, Ch. 21.
The truth of the foregoing statements appears to have been borne out. See, e.g., Petition
of Benitez, 113 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although a seaman's life has
changed dramatically since Richard Henry Dana wrote his classic tale Two Years
Before the Mast in the 19th century, the modem seaman still occupies a position that a
few other occupations do. Consider that a seaman may be away from home for as long
as three months at a time, twice a year. In light of such a work schedule, he may be less
likely to follow conventional styles of relationships than his shore-bound counterpart,
who returns home every day. Thus, who should be considered a widow is a question
needing even more urgent consideration for the seaman than for society in general.
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